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long ago, Charles Moody1 and I had teamed up to write an

article addressing proposals for finance reform of judicial elections in Texas. In the process we found ourselves pondering a
fundamental question - what is the proper role of judges in a society
that has vague, but strongly held, notions of democracy and concerns
over who "picks" the judges? It is my honor to provide this year's Foreword to the SMU Law Review's 1995 Annual Survey of Texas Law. In
setting the tone for this volume, it appears to me to be particularly appropriate to tweak the subject of judicial selection in Texas. But rather than
enter the war of words over how we should select our judges, I believe
there has been too little debate over the question Charles and I confronted - a question which I believe must be answered before the citizens of this State could ever hope to come to a consensus on a proper
method of selection. To state the question:
"Judicial accountability"2 has a virtuous ring to it, until one asks, "accountability" for what?
What follows are our reflections on this basic question.
I. JUDGES IN THE POLITICAL ARENA
By now the problem highlighted seven years ago in the 60 Minutes
broadcast raising the question "Justice for Sale?"'3 is a familiar one to
* Justice, Supreme Court of Texas; LL.M., University of Virginia School of Law,
Graduate Program for Judges; J.D., B.A., Southern Methodist University.
1. Formerly briefing attorney for Chief Justice Tom Phillips of the Texas Supreme
Court, now with Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody in Austin, Texas.
2. Hans A. Linde, The Judge as PoliticalCandidate,40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 3 (1992).
3. 60 Minutes: Justicefor Sale? (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 6, 1987).

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

most Texans, lawyers and non-lawyers alike. The immediate focus of that
story was the substantial contributions made to the presiding judge in the
Texaco v. Pennzoil case, 4 who was then up for re-election, by the lawyers
on both sides of the case. The broader topic was the influence of money
on judicial elections and judicial performance.

Texas is among an increasingly smaller handful of states that still elect
their judges through party-affiliated primary ballots and at partisan general elections. 5 Like state representatives and senators, governors, U.S.
representatives and senators, and Presidents, judges in Texas must make
political appearances and advertise. Such campaigning costs money.

More than perhaps any other issue in the selection of judges, how the
funds necessary to support a successful campaign are generated should
squarely focus attention on the role of the judge and the propriety of
6
judges acting like politicians.
Since the 60 Minutes story, some changes have occurred in Texas,

though not all for the better. All the judges involved in that 60 Minutes
program are no longer serving, having either retired, not sought reelection, or been defeated in their next election. Also, voters appear to be
more selective in their voting patterns, not casting their votes along either
party lines or slates promoted by any particular special interest group.

Whereas through 1987, only a small number of supreme court justices felt
compelled to raise and spend large sums of money on their campaign
(and in any event they raised only a few hundreds of thousands of dol-

lars), by 1992 virtually every incumbent justice reasonably expected an
election opponent and the prospect of raising and spending over $1 million. The concerns raised by the size and source of political donations to
7
Texas judges have not abated.

To an extent, this attention may be part of a general concern that public officials are overly dependent on financial contributions. 8 When the
4. 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert.
dism'd, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
5. As of 1992, eight states used partisan elections to select the judiciary. CITIZENS'
COMMISSION ON THE TEXAS JUDICIAL SYSTEM, INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY app. J.,
at 54. Since then, two more states abandoned partisan elections. Mississippi recently
amended its election laws to move to nonpartisan judicial elections, 1994 Miss. Laws 564
§ 80, and Tennessee enacted nonpartisan retention elections. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4114 (1994).
6. The ,reporter for the ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct referred to the problem of campaign finance as "probably ... the greatest of all conflicts between political
necessity and judicial impartiality." E.W. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO THE CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT 98 (1973), quoted in PATRICK MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE
LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

138

n.33

(1990).

7. See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, Lawyers Give, Judges Take, Ethics Experts Worry, FORT
WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, July 11, 1994, at Al; PickingJudges, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, July 12, 1994, at A18.
8. The first section of a recent New York Times contained separate stories reporting
the death, for the present congressional term, of campaign finance reform legislation and
describing the President's fund-raising campaign since his election, consisting of private
briefings, White House parties, and seats at state dinners for significant donors. See David
E. Rosenbaum, The 1994 Campaign: Campaign Finance; G.O.P. Filibuster Defeats Campaign Finance Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1994, at 1, 9.
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public officials are judges, however, the concerns are particularly acute.
Most obviously, this is true when donations are made by persons appearing before the judges, as in the 60 Minutes story. But even beyond this
situation, there is a general discomfort with the notion of judicial
campaigning and fundraising that does not follow other elected officials:
a sense that it is not "judicial" to seek support, monetary or otherwise. In
the case of judges, I suspect, many people find troubling not just the idea
of judges being responsive to particular litigants, but also the idea of
judges being responsive to public sentiment in general.
At the same time, and perhaps more so in Texas than in many other
places, populist roots run deep, and the notion of accountable elected
officials is one that commands strong allegiance. Senior Judge Hans
Linde of Oregon described a similar ambivalence in writing of the public's "two conflicting ideals" regarding judges: "[f]irst, they are to follow
the law without fear or favor, regardless of personal sympathies and preferences," and "[s]econd, they are to reach results that are preferred by or
at least acceptable to their communities." 9
These distinct, and arguably contradictory, ideals are evident in the
types of political advertisements and speeches one hears during judicial
elections. Some candidates rely on claims of integrity and a pledge to
"adjudicate, not legislate from the bench." Others, particularly in recent
elections, have directly targeted judicial decisions as issues in the campaign. During a 1994 Democratic primary race for the Texas Supreme
Court, one challenger circulated a brochure picturing an abused woman
and portrayed the incumbent justice as a judge who voted for wrongdoers
rather than victims. The obvious implication was that if voters did not
like the result in that case, they needed to elect the challenger in order to
produce a different result.
It seems apparent that these candidates are directing their advertisements and speeches at people with substantially different visions of a
judge's role. Moreover, it seems clear that, at least in the calculation of
some candidates and political advisers, the group of voters who will find it
perfectly appropriate to campaign on a promise to reach a certain type of
result is sufficiently large to make such an assertion an advantageous
campaign strategy. 10

9. Linde, supra note 2, at 1.
10. It might be argued in response that this distinction is more superficial than real, in
that a promise to "adjudicate, not legislate" will be understood by many voters to connote
a judicial approach likely to lead to outcomes that they favor, and that they may choose to
support the candidate for reasons that are little different from those of the voters who
respond to the brochure of the abused woman. Even to the extent some voters may make
such an assumption, though, I do not think the distinction can be erased so easily, at least
not in the context of a court of exclusively civil jurisdiction. If the "adjudicate, not legis-

late" candidate were to run a comparable overtly issue-oriented campaign (e.g., promising

to "protect large companies from expansive tort awards," or to "resist the expansion of
civil rights for minority groups"), he or she would (rightly) be dismissed outright by most
of these same voters for adopting an unjudicious approach.
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When we view these trends - increasingly contested and often bitter
judicial campaigns, large sums of money being pumped into judicial races,
and candidates presenting drastically different pictures of their promised
performance once in office - in conjunction, we must conclude that we
are not engaged merely in a series of periodic efforts to fine-tune the
electoral process. Rather, we are engaged in a basic debate over the true
role of the judiciary in our society.
II.

A.

PERSPECTIVES ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

SUPERIOR "DEMOCRATIC PEDIGREE" FOR ELECTED JUDGES?

In a 1989 article, Justice Robert Utter of the Washington Supreme
Court argued that because of electoral checks on the constitutional jurisprudence of state courts which do not exist at the federal level, the actions of state courts may be more "democratically legitimate" than those
of their federal counterparts."

Specifically, Justice Utter highlighted two

checks on the actions of state court justices: (1) in a majority of states,
justices are answerable to the electorate, either by being elected initially
or by facing periodic retention elections, and (2) as a rule, the procedures

cumbersome than the procefor amending a state constitution are far less 12
dure for amending the federal Constitution.

Both circumstances make it possible for voters to "correct" the direction of constitutional interpretation by their state courts. Because the
process of state constitutional interpretation thus permits a type of "giveand-take" between the courts and the voters, Justice Utter suggests, the
13
product that emerges is more authoritative than the federal analogue.
The voters can validate a court decision either by not producing a public
outcry against the decision' 4 or by creating a popular reaction against the
decision that is not strong enough to result in amendment of the constitution.' 5 Indeed, even indirect signs of popular sentiment revealed in the
legislative arena serve this role: where the Oregon Supreme Court relied
on the state constitution to afford criminal suspects greater protections
than required by the U.S. Constitution, and a subsequent ballot initiative
by Oregon voters for statutory changes in related areas (victims' compensation, sentencing and parole, and search-and-seizure law) was defeated,
"[tihe Oregon Supreme Court is entitled to consider the defeat of this
11. Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and
DemocraticAccountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 35
(1989).
12. Id.

13. See id. at 44 ("[T]he more democratic nature of the state judiciary can provide

positive feedback for assessing state court independent decisions.").

14. See id. at 37 ("[W]here an important state court decision interprets the state constitution to provide more protection than its federal counterpart, the absence of negative
commentary is significant.").
15. See id. (citing the example of Washington, in which a proposed constitutional
amendment requiring the state courts to apply federal search-and-seizure precedent failed
to gain legislative approval).
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measure a democratic
legitimation of much of its independent state con16
stitutional analysis.'
B.

DOES POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY EQUAL DEMOCRATIC
LEGITIMACY?

I have thought Justice Utter's argument worth summarizing because it
seems representative of a school of thought that embraces issue-specific
advertising, party-affiliated primaries, etc., for judges. 17 In general, the
view is evidently that the breakdown of distinctions between the judiciary
and other branches of government is to be welcomed and promoted, because in so doing we lessen the anomalous, undemocratic character of the
judiciary.1 8 Thus, Justice Utter finds greater "democratic legitimacy" in a
system where such distinctions are weakened at least to the extent that
(1) judicial decisions are less permanent in character, because of the relative ease of a popular overrule through constitutional amendment, and
(2) judges must answer to the electorate for politically unpopular decisions. I suggest a third convergence of the operations of the judicial and
legislative branches might be added, although Justice Utter stops short of
hailing it as progress in his article. The first two checks will operate not
only after the fact, but before the fact; inevitably, judicial decisions themselves will be made in a more overtly politically conscious manner. 19
Certainly, the undemocratic nature of the judicial role, and particularly
judicial review of legislative action, is an issue that has troubled commentators from the days of the founding of the republic. In fact, Justice Utter's argument seems in some ways a modem entrant to a recurring
debate in our history: "[i]s judicial review a menace to popular democracy [or] a way to perfect democratic government?" 20 This debate provides a good background against which to assess the claim that greater
21
popular control over judges confers greater democratic legitimacy.
16. Id. at 36.
17. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
18. On the occasion of his successor's swearing-in, Justice Oscar Mauzy noted that
judicial elections have value in that when judges "are insulated from the real world, there's
a dangerous tendency for them to lose sight of the real impact on everyday people that
their decisions are." New Justices Sworn in, Including First Woman, AUSTIN AMERICANSTATESMAN, Jan. 2, 1993, at B1.
19. Justice Utter recognizes that this is an inescapable component of the type of judicial system he describes by including at the outset of his article the following quote:
"There's no way a judge is going to be able to ignore the political consequences of certain

decisions, especially if he or she has to make them near election time. That would be like
ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub." Utter, supra note 11, at 19 (quoting former Califor-

nia Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus). While Justice Utter calls judicial independence a
"clearly desirable goal" to be balanced against accountability, id. at 44, the example he
cites of a lack of independence is the intentional delaying of the publication of an opinion
for political reasons; it is not clear whether reaching a particular outcome in a case in
deference to political opinion would, under his analysis, be an unfortunate side effect or
the proper functioning of the system.
20. ALBERT P. MELONE &
177 (1988).

GEORGE MACE, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND AMERICAN DE-

MOCRACY

21. Justice Utter's principal area of focus was, of course, state constitutionallaw. Likewise, most of the historical perspectives on judicial independence that I will mention also
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The classic justification for an independent judiciary is contained in
FederalistPapers numbers 78 and 81, published in 1788 to urge ratifica-

tion of the newly-drafted Constitution and believed to have been authored by Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton began from the premise that

all acts by an agent contrary to the agent's commission from the principal
are void. It therefore follows, Hamilton argued, that under a constitution
in which the legislature holds limited, delegated powers from its principal

(the People), all legislative acts contrary to the legislature's commission
(the Constitution) must be void. 22 The function of assessing when the
legislature has exceeded the scope of its authority is obviously one that
must rest with a body other than the legislature itself, and the constitu-

tional framers decided to place this power with the judiciary. That the
judiciary could, on this basis, overturn acts of the legislature did not imply

a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power, Hamilton argued;
rather, "[i]t only supposes that the power of the people [as expressed in
'23
the fundamental law of the Constitution] is superior to both.
This analogy alone does not go very far towards establishing the need
for a judiciary independent of direct popular control, as opposed to
merely a judiciary separate from the legislative branch. Why, we might
ask, cannot "the People" ratify or disapprove each act of their agent, the

Congress, as it is made? Or, if we are going to have a separate judiciary,
should not the judiciary at least be continually sensitive and responsive to

"the People's" instructions as to the scope of authority they intend Congress to exercise on their behalf? Hamilton's opponent in this particular
phase of the Federalist-Antifederalist debates, who adopted the pseudo-

nym of Brutus, raised similar arguments. This writer, believed to be constitutional delegate and New York Supreme Court Judge Robert Yates,

questioned the need for judges to be appointed for life so as to be free
from popular control. Although obtaining life tenure for judges in England represented an important reform because it freed them from the
control of a hereditary monarch with a tendency toward despotism, the
effect in America, Yates argued, would be to insulate them from the will

are directed to judicial review on constitutional grounds, largely at the federal level, as this
has been the dominant focus of scholarly attention over the years. I recognize that in some
ways this is not the area of most immediate relevance to issues of campaign finance reform.
The decisions that tend to generate the most controversy and that probably drive the highdollar contributions to judicial campaigns in Texas tend to be tort decisions. And, as has
been noted, the theoretical foundations for judicial action in a common-law context and in
a constitutional context are to some extent distinct questions. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 67-68 (1980). But see infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
However, the constitutional context crystallizes the issue of judicial independence, and I
think that the concepts addressed have relevance to the current cultural debate about the
judge's role. Moreover, it seems likely that, as it has over the last decade, constitutional
adjudication will continue to be an increasing part of the state courts' role, making the
parallel to the cited materials even closer.
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton), reprinted in MELONE & MACE, supra note
20, at 198, 200 [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST No. 78].
23. Id. at 201.
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of a free and democratic people24 and thereby elevate judges above the
people's elected representatives.
Hamilton's answer was that the elimination of a hereditary monarch
did not remove the threat of despotism. Rather, in a nation based on
popular sovereignty the chief danger of encroachment would be shifted
to the institution where popular power is exercised most directly - the
legislature. Hamilton wrote: "In a monarchy [life tenure for judges] is an
excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less
excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of a representative body."' 25 The encroachments he envisioned are ones which, after two
centuries of experience with the effects that interest group lobbying or
temporary prejudice-based hysteria can have on legislative activity, we
should have little difficulty in recognizing. Hamilton feared the "ill
humors" that, through "the arts of designing men, or the influence of
particular conjunctures" might temporarily gain sway and "occasion...
'26
serious oppressions of the minority party in the community.
The answer to the seeming contradiction of how the judiciary can simultaneously act on behalf of "the People," in the sense of the agent who
has conferred Congress's authority, and also act to check encroachments
by "the People," acting through their legislative representatives in a particular circumstance, is the elegant balance of the constitutional structure.
The will of the people that emerges from the solemn deliberative process
of constitutional ratification or amendment is elevated to fundamental
law. It binds even future majorities from adopting a course contrary to its
principles.
In being entrusted with the responsibility of vindicating this fundamental law in the face of popular sentiment that may run strongly in the other
direction, the judiciary is in a sense assigned the role of the "conscience"
of a democratic society. It is as if the judge is entrusted with reminding
the people of the pledge they made to conduct society's affairs according
to certain basic precepts and moral aspirations (e.g., securing certain freedoms and rights in a universal and neutral manner), even when in the
immediate context being faithful to that precept is difficult and unpopular. 27 Ultimate sovereignty always remains with the people of the present: if the population is sufficiently committed to an idea to go through
24. See BRUTUS XV (Mar. 20, 1788), reprinted in MELONE & MACE, supra note 20, at
189, 191-94.
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 20, at 198, 199.
26. Id. at 202.

27. An example from the relatively recent past might be the Supreme Court's invalidation on First Amendment grounds of Texas's flag-burning statute in Texas v. Johnson, 109

S. Ct. 2533 (1989). Although my point is not to endorse or criticize the specific outcome in
that case, I think it is a good illustration of the type of case for which we have judicial
review by an independent judiciary. The Justices in the majority acted from a conviction
that our broad constitutional commitment to free speech required the result, despite their

obvious distaste for the acts of the defendant being shielded in the particular instance - a
distaste that was no doubt shared by a vast majority of voters and that would seem futile to
expect a legislature to disregard. Concurring, Justice Kennedy made the following
observations:
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the elaborate process of constitutional amendment and again become
"the People" in the constitutional sense, they can undo the limits imposed
by their forebears. However, "[u]ntil the people have, by solemn and
authoritative act, annulled or changed the established form, it is binding
upon themselves collectively, as well as individually. ' 28
If the judge's role is, in part, to act as the "conscience" of our democracy against the passions of the day, it seems clear that some degree of
independence from popular control is an integral part of our political system. Professor Harry Wellington has suggested that a similar analysis applies in the area of common-law adjudication. He argued that "in much
the same way that the judicial interpretation of documents (contracts,
statutes, constitutions - especially constitutions) must proceed from the
document," judicial reasoning in common-law cases "must proceed from
society's set of moral principles and ideals."'29 The faithful derivation and
application of these evolving ideals is best assured, he argued, by the process through which accretions are made to common-law precedent, free
of political pressure:
The major difficulty for the official charged with the task of determining how the moral principles bear in a particular case is in disengaging himself from contemporary prejudices which are easily
confused with moral principles. He must escape the passion of the
moment and achieve an appropriately historical perspective....
The problem is not entirely solved by the institutions we do have,
but the common law manages reasonably well. Judges do not resort
to moral principles in their pristine form as justification for common
law rules. Rather, those principles are worked through a process
which has some promise of filtering out the prejudices and passions
The case before us illustrates better than most that the judicial power is
often difficult in its exercise....
The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like.
We make them because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the
Constitution, as we see them, compel the result.
... [T]he flag is constant in expressing beliefs Americans share, beliefs in
law and peace and that freedom which sustains the human spirit. The case
here today forces recognition of the costs to which those beliefs commit us.
Id. at 2548-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In fact, shortly after this decision, public uproar
led Congress to respond by making flag burning a federal crime. The Supreme Court once
again struck down the legislation. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
The notion that having Congress's agency defined in the abstract in the Constitution by
persons not in the midst of a particular heated controversy such as flag-burning (and indeed, not knowing which such controversies will arise, perhaps unable to predict where
their sentiments and interests would lie) gives the agency so defined a more authoritative
claim to represent the true principles and aspirations of society brings to mind Professor
John Rawls's famous theory. Professor Rawls postulated a "veil of ignorance," behind
which people would be forced to make decisions about the organizing principles for society
without knowledge of the position and resources they would hold in that society. See JOHN
RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 20, at 198, 202.
29. Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 244 (1973).
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the judge with distance
of the moment, some promise of providing
30
and a necessary historical perspective.
The filtering process described by Professor Wellington is the method of
legal analysis: receiving common-law precedent, examining the justification for a common-law rule in light of the background from which it is
derived, and, if appropriate, expanding that justification to address a new
and unforeseen situation posed by31changing and increasingly complex social and commercial interactions.
The foregoing summary shows, I believe, that at least under traditional
democratic theory regarding the judiciary, political responsiveness has little to do with "democratic legitimacy." Whatever legitimacy judges possess, it comes from competence to fulfill a particular function. In the area
of constitutional law, it is principled adherence to a written document in
the face of changing political currents. In the common-law arena, it is
thoughtful and deliberate application of established principles to new circumstances. Direct political accountability for judicial decisions does
nothing to ensure this type of competence.
C.

"UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION" OF POLITICALLY ACCOUNTABLE
JUDGES

I used the phrase "direct political accountability for judicial decisions"
in the preceding sentence because it appears to me the necessary result of
Justice Utter's thesis set forth in subpart A, and also the objective of
many seeking to shape the judicial role in Texas today. If legitimacy for
judicial action derives from popular approval (or, more accurately, the
lack of popular disapproval), then presumably the more accountable a
judge can manage to be, the better. Indeed, because the proper operation of the judiciary as described by Justice Utter relies upon voters paying attention to the outcomes being reached by state courts and casting
ballots in judicial races based upon their approval or disapproval of those
outcomes, we would need an electoral process that focuses voters' attention on those outcomes as squarely as possible. Under such circumstances, it would be not merely artificial, but indeed illegitimate, to forbid
judicial candidates to campaign expressly on the issues being decided by
the court, as both the ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct and Texas's
Code of Judicial Conduct currently do. 32 If the proper balance between
30. Id. at 248.
31. See id. at 250-54.
32. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCt Canon 5(A)(3)(d) (1990) ("A candidate
shall not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office, and shall not make statements that commit or
appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases or controversies that are likely to
come before the court."). The Texas version retains the first part of the model canon
(prohibiting promises other than the faithful and impartial performance of duties) but substitutes the following prohibition for the second part:

A judge or judicial candidate shall not make statements that indicate an
opinion on any issue that may be subject to judicial interpretation by the
office which is being sought or held, except that discussion of an individual's

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

judicial authority and popular control depends upon voters' ability to
check the direction of the court's interpretations of a constitutional guarantee, then the voter must be able to learn from the justices' challengers

overturn those decisions if elected and given the
that they will
33
opportunity.

Little from Hamilton's (or Wellington's) view of the judiciary is recognizable in this picture. Admittedly, it may not be a fair criticism of Justice
Utter's view to argue that it is inconsistent with the judicial role envi-

sioned by the framers of the federal Constitution, when Justice Utter's
very point is to contrast of the state system with the federal system. The
discussion in subpart B reveals, however, at least in summary form, the
justification for judicial authority under the federal constitutional theory.
Judges are given authority, including the authority in certain circumstances to overturn legislative acts, and are insulated from direct popular

pressure because of a belief in judges' institutional competence to make
decisions necessary to our scheme of constitutional government. As one
commentator has expressed it, "in one way or another most theories of
judicial review turn on the belief that judges have something unique to
the nature of this contribucontribute to public decisionmaking and that
'34
tion is closely tied to political insulation.
It would seem incumbent upon those insisting that judges be more politically accountable to offer a comparable justification for the judicial

role as they envision it. What is the "unique contribution" to public decisionmaking made by judges whose jurisprudence is subject to popular
control, and thus inescapably guided by popular opinion? Under such a
system, what justifies the structural authority with which courts are
endowed?
judicial philosophy is appropriate if conducted in a manner which does not
suggest to a reasonable person a probable decision on any particular case.
TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(1) (1994).

33. Professor Stephen Carter of Yale Law School is among the commentators who
have suggested that requiring contested elections, but restricting the types of campaigning,
is an uneasy and perhaps unworkable compromise between the conflicting ideals of the
judicial role. In an address to the 1993 Forum for State Court Judges co-sponsored by the
Roscoe Pound Foundation and Yale Law School, Professor Carter observed:
My preference is for retention elections instead of contested elections, but if
contested elections are going to be held, I do think candidates should be
allowed to campaign. If the record of an incumbent cannot be criticized, the
purpose of a contested election is difficult to see.
Stephen L. Carter, Does Democracy Threaten JudicialIndependence?, in PRESERVING THE
INDEPENDENCE

OF THE JUDICIARY:

THE DUAL

CHALLENGE

OF DEMOCRACY

AND

BUDGET CRISIS 37, 41 (1993). Professor Carter also noted the likelihood that restrictions
such as those in Canon 5 of the Model and Texas Codes will be held unconstitutional. Id.
at 40.
34. Robert F. Nagel, Political Pressure and Judging in Constitutional Cases, 61 U.
COLO. L. REV. 685, 685-86 (1990). The writings of numerous constitutional theorists bear
out Professor Nagel's description. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 24 (1962) (in justifying judicial
review, "[tihe search must be for a function . . . which differs from the legislative and
executive functions; which is peculiarly suited to the capabilities of courts; which will not
likely be performed elsewhere if courts do not assume it.").
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I find it difficult to answer these questions satisfactorily, especially
since the notion of a judiciary that finds authority for its decisions in a
lack of public disapproval seems necessarily to imply an expansive judicial role. Writing in 1893, Harvard Law Professor James B. Thayer lamented the extent to which the perception of constitutional checks from
the courts created a tendency for legislators to abdicate their responsibility for assessing the justice and constitutionality of legislation they passed.
Legislators were encouraged to believe, Professor Thayer wrote, that
their duty to be just consisted only of staying within constitutional limits,
and that even the obligation of staying within constitutional limits was
one that need not preoccupy them, because if they were wrong the courts
35
would correct it.
I fear a similar danger, removed one degree further, is presented by the
system described by Justice Utter. If judges are encouraged to believe
popular disapproval provides a measure of when a decision exceeds the
scope of their legitimate authority, it is unlikely they will be restrained by
a sense of their limited institutional competence. This concerns me, because the checks cited by Justice Utter are hardly in balance. Even in a
state with the simplest procedures for amending a constitution, it is far
easier to align five 36 justices behind an outcome than to mount the type
of campaign necessary to amend the state's fundamental law. For this
reason, I question the assumption that making decisions that voters fail to
overturn is, in any true sense, democratic legitimation.
The invitation to a more expansive, politically guided role is also dangerous because, whether politically accountable or not, courts in our
country wield great power. This is one aspect of the previously mentioned debate between Hamilton and Yates in which Yates proved far
more prescient. Hamilton argued that citizens had nothing to fear regarding judicial usurpations, because institutionally it was the weakest of
the three branches. He noted that the judiciary "has no influence over
either the sword or the purse," meaning that it could not enforce its own
judgments and was permanently subservient to the legislature's authority
to allocate revenues. 37 Accordingly, the judiciary would be unable to
stray too far from the directions of the executive or legislative branches
because it would find itself without the means to enforce its judgments.
In a conclusion now quoted only with irony, 38 Hamilton dubbed the judiciary the "least dangerous" branch. 39 This prediction has proved false.
Because of simple popular allegiance to the constitutional scheme, even
35. James B.Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrineof Constitutional

Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893), reprinted in MELONE & MACE, supra note 20, at 78, 95.

36. I say five justices because five is the magic number for a majority opinion in the
United States Supreme Court and the Texas Supreme Court. In fact, four is the more
common magic number in that most states' supreme courts have only seven justices. CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION
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sweeping and unpopular decisions of the courts become the law of the
land, and the backing of the executive branch - at least to the extent of
enforcement - is secure.
If, on the basis of political accountability, courts feel more free embracing a policymaking role, what justification exists for such authority?
What is the "unique contribution" that such courts make to the democratic process? It cannot be their accountability itself, because even with
all the checks Justice Utter's system implies, courts will be less representative and responsive than legislatures. A state supreme court will typically be a body of seven or so members, not elected to represent
particular geographical constituencies and not equipped to receive and
act upon requests by voters. As Professor John Hart Ely has written:
Sophisticated commentary never tires of reminding us that legislatures are only imperfectly democratic. Beyond the fact that the appropriate answer is to make them more democratic, however, the
point is one that on analysis may backfire. The existing antimajoritarian influences in Congress and the state legislatures, capable though they may be of blocking legislation, are not well situated
to get legislation passed in the face of majority opposition. That
makes all the more untenable the suggestion under consideration,
that courts should invalidate legislation in the name of a supposed
contrary consensus. Beyond that, however, we may grant until we're
blue in the face that legislatures aren't wholly democratic, but
that
40
isn't going to make courts more democratic than legislatures.
In one sense, a court that accepts the notion that it ought to be responsive to political pressure offers the worst of all possible worlds: because
of the nature of the office, a judge cannot successfully receive an adequate sampling of views and concerns by constituents, yet because of the
small size and more direct power of a court as compared to a legislative
body, a court will be an inviting target to the monied special interests who
see the court as a promising avenue for promotion of their agendas.
D.

POLITICAL CONTROL AND CAMPAIGN REFORMS

My point is not that all forms of political control, including the fact that
judges in most states are subjected to a method of selection that includes
an election component, are necessarily wrong. My point is simply that all
such forms of political control are compromises with the vision of the
judicial role we have inherited from the Constitution's framers and the
Anglo-American tradition, and they are compromises we should make
only in pursuit of some distinct and separate goal. 41 We may, for exam40. ELY, supra note 21, at 67.

41. One can, of course, take issue in a number of ways with this picture of the judicial
role, and many commentators have. The most obvious response is that, in reality, adjudication is more the imposition of personal value choices than a precise scientific endeavor,
and that therefore it is more important to have persons occupying judicial posts who reflect
society's wishes than to ensure an appropriately rarified atmosphere for the adjudicative
process. See LINDE, supra note 2, at 4. A related but less sweeping critique would be to
question whether even the task of discerning society's fundamental commitments embod-
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pie, conclude that we are more likely to wind up with persons of integrity
and ability in judicial positions through a partisan electoral process than
through some other method of selection. If so, then we should maintain
the status quo because doing so produces people more able to fulfill the
judicial role described in subpart B above, not because popular control is
itself a desirable modification of the judicial role. And judges should not
then assume a greater license to act by virtue of being elected.
Similar considerations should apply to judicial selection reform, to ethical guidelines governing judicial campaigning, and to the other judicial
reforms presently being considered in Texas. In considering such reforms, we should begin with a vision of what we want our judiciary to be.
My hope is that this vision would be close to the one described in subpart
B: independent men and women committed to a scholarly and principled
interpretation of the law and restrained by a keen sense of the courts'
limited institutional competence. Reforms should then be assessed
against this aspiration. Where they seem likely to bring us closer to that
vision, they should be supported. Where they seem in tension with that
vision, the benefits they offer should be identified and carefully weighed
to see if they are worth the cost.
III.

CONCLUSION

Again, I wish to thank the editors, particularly Albert Lin, of the SMU
Law Review's 1995 Annual Survey of Texas Law, for giving me the opportunity to present this Foreword. It has given me the opportunity to reflect
on what role a judge plays in a democracy and for what is a judge "accountable." As you explore this volume of the SMU Law Review, I ask
you to consider whether the decisions are principled, or whether they are
excursions into the world of popular will. Are these decisions more or
less "democratically legitimate" by virtue of the current selection process
for the judges? Would some other method of selection of judges enhance
or diminish this legitimacy?

ied in a constitution or in the common law is most effectively carried out when judges are
isolated from popular input. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 21, at 57.
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